Introduction
The Founders and the Enlightenment end of the nineteenth century this awe for the founders and their mythical reputation was being questioned, and historians began puncturing the aura of divinity surrounding them. In 1896 a popular historian of the period, John Bach McMaster, wrote an essay, entitled "The Political Depravity of the Founding Fathers," in which he contended that "in all the frauds and tricks that go to make up the worst form of practical politics, the men who founded our State and national governments were always our equals, and often our masters." According to McMaster, the founding generation was not above the worst kinds of political shenanigans, including the silencing of newspapers, the manipulation and destruction of votes, and the creation of partisan gerrymandering. McMaster's muckraking of the revolutionary leaders was only the beginning of what soon became a full-scale campaign. In 1897 Sydney George Fisher attempted to refute William Gladstone's view that the American Constitution was "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man" with his Evolution of the
Constitution of the United States, Showing That It Is a Development of Progressive History and Not an Isolated Document Struck Off at a Given Time or an Imitation of English or Dutch Forms of Government.
Fisher thought that the reputation of the founders was so inflated with myths and fables that he devoted his entire career to bringing the events of the American Revolution and its leaders down to earth. In a paper, The Legendary and Myth-Making Process in Histories of the American Revolution, delivered before the American Philosophical Society in 1912, Fisher called for the substitution of "truth and actuality for the mawkish sentimentality and nonsense with which we have been so long nauseated." As his contribution he wrote books with such titles as The True Benjamin Franklin (1900) and The True History of the American Revolution (1902) . 3 state legislatures and a life-tenured Supreme Court, professional academics responded by showing that the Constitution not only was not divinely inspired but was not even a natural expression of American popular democracy. In 1907 J. Allen Smith in his Spirit of American Government set forth the emerging view that the Constitution was a reactionary, aristocratic document designed by its checks and balances, difficulty of amendment, and judicial review to thwart the popular will.
With more and more scholars in the Progressive Era stressing the undemocratic nature of the Constitution, the way was prepared for the historiographical explosion that Charles Beard made in 1913 with An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. Beard's book, which was part of the "revolt against formalism" occurring everywhere in the Western world in those years, became the most influential history book ever written in America. It came to represent and dominate an entire generation's thinking about history and especially about the origins of the Constitution. By absorbing the diffused thinking of Marx and Freud and the assumptions of behaviorist psychology, Beard and others of his generation came to conceive of ideas as rationalizations, as masks obscuring the underlying interests and drives that actually determined social behavior. For too long, it seemed, historians had detached ideas from the material conditions that produced them and had invested them with an independent power that was somehow alone responsible for the determination of events. As Beard pointed out in the introduction to the 1935 edition of his Economic Interpretation, previous historians of the Constitution had assumed that ideas were "entities, particularities, or forces, apparently independent of all earthly considerations coming under the head of 'economic.' " Beard, like many of his contemporaries, sought to bring to the fore "those realistic features of economic conflict, stress and strain" that previous historians had ignored. 4 By suggesting that the framers of the Constitution were motivated by their underlying economic interests, Beard removed the mantle of disinterested virtue that they had traditionally been wrapped in. However crude and mistaken Beard's particular findings have turned out to be, his underlying assumption that people's consciousness and ultimately their behavior were the products of their social and economic circumstances had a lasting effect on American historical scholarship. After Beard's book, debunking of the myths and legends surrounding the founding generation became increasingly popular. Because George Washington had been especially subject to mythologizing, he was often singled out for deflating. Indeed, in the 1920s the popular writer W. E.
Woodward invented the word debunk to describe the process of revealing the unattractive qualities of particular characters, and Washington became one of his favorite targets.
Given this century-long tradition of deflating the reputations of the founders, we should not be surprised by any current criticism of the revolutionary generation. Precisely because these founders have become so important to Americans, so central to our sense of who we are, there is a natural tendency to use them as a means of criticizing America and its culture. If one wants to condemn, say, America's treatment of minorities or its imperialistic behavior, there is no better way than to bash one or more of the founders. Indeed, demonizing the founders, especially Jefferson, has become something of a cottage industry over the past forty years or so.
Although criticizing the founding generation has been going on for more than a century, there does seem to be something new and different about the present-day academic vilification. Historians' defaming of these elite white males seems much more widespread than it used to be. Sometimes this criticism has taken the form of historians' purposely ignoring the politics and the achievements of the founders altogether, as if what they did were not all that important. Instead, as has been pointed out, much of the best work on the history of the early Republic during the past several decades has concentrated on recovering the lost voices of ordinary people-a midwife in Maine or a former slave in Connecticut-or on emphasizing the popular cultural matrix of the period that transcends the leadership of the great white males.
5 Of course, historians with no connection to academia or no interest in esoteric academic debates continue to write histories and biographies of the founders that are widely popu-lar. But academic historians over the past forty years have tended to focus on issues of race, class, and gender in the early Republic and to shun issues of politics and political leadership.
When the founders are not ignored but confronted directly, presentday criticism of them is much more devastating than that of the past.
Despite his exposing of what he took to be the founders' underlying economic motives, Beard always respected the men who framed the Constitution. "Never in the history of assemblies," he wrote in 1912, "has there been a convention of men richer in political experience and in practical knowledge, or endowed with a profounder insight into the springs of human action and the intimate essence of government."
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Recent historians critical of the founders express little of this kind of respect. They are not interested, as earlier critics were, in simply stripping away myths and legends to get at the human beings hidden from view. If anything, some of these critical historians want to dehumanize, not humanize, the founders. Because our present-day culture has lost a great deal of its former respect for absolute values and timeless truths, we have a harder time believing that the eighteenth-century founders have anything important or transcendent to say to us in the twenty-first century. Even in constitutional jurisprudence, which has a natural bias toward discovering the intentions of the framers of the Constitution, the reputation of the founders has lost some of its former appeal, and original intent is no longer taken for granted but has become a matter of contentious debate among scholars and jurists. It appears more evident than ever before that the founders do not share our modern views about important matters, about race, the role of woman, and equality. Hence it is easier now to dismiss them as racists, sexists, and elitists.
Certainly debunking has become much more common for generations of young people raised on reading about J. D. Salinger's Holden Caulfield and his condemnation of adult phoniness. As popular writer Dave Eggers points out, debunking is what he does as a magazine editor. Every day he edits one article after another "in a long line of contrarian articles point-ing out the falsity of most things the world believes in, holds dear." Since even "a version of the Bible written for black kids," and "the student loan program," and "the idea of college in general, and work in general, and marriage, and makeup, and the Grateful Dead" are not immune from debunking, it stands to reason that the founders and their achievements would not be either. 7 In fact some historians today do not believe that the revolutionaries got much of anything right. In their scholarly opinion, the Revolution has become pretty much a failure. As one historian has put it, the Revolution "failed to free the slaves, failed to offer full political equality to women, . . . failed to grant citizenship to Indians, [and] failed to create an economic world in which all could compete on equal terms."
8 Despite all the criticism and debunking of these founders, they still seem to remain for most Americans, if not for most academic historians, an extraordinary elite, their achievements scarcely matched by those of any other generation in American history. Most Americans appear to believe that these revolutionary leaders constituted an incomparable generation of men who had a powerful and permanent impact on America's subsequent history. The founders appear even more marvelous than even those they emulated, the great legislators of classical antiquity, precisely because they are more real. They are not mythical characters but authentic historical figures about whom there exists a remarkable amount of historical evidence. For our knowledge of the founders, unlike that of many of the classical heroes, we do not have to rely on hazy legends or poetic tales. We have not only everything the revolutionary leaders ever published but also an incredible amount of their private correspondence and their most intimate thoughts, made available with a degree of editorial completeness and expertness rarely achieved in the Western world's recovery of its documentary past.
In spite of the extent and meticulousness of this historical recovery, to most Americans the founders still seem larger than life as well as possessing political and intellectual capacities well beyond our own. The awe that most of us feel when we look back at them is thus mingled with an acute the founders and the enlightenment 9 sense of loss. Somehow for a brief moment ideas and power, intellectualism and politics, came together-indeed were one with each other-in a way never again duplicated in American history.
There is no doubt that the founders were men of ideas, were, in fact, the leading intellectuals of their day. But they were as well the political leaders of their day, politicians who competed for power, lost and won elections, served in their colonial and state legislatures or in the Congress, became governors, judges, and even presidents. Of course they were neither "intellectuals" nor "politicians," for the modern meaning of these terms suggests the very separation between them that the revolutionaries avoided. They were intellectuals without being alienated and political leaders without being obsessed with votes. They lived mutually in the world of ideas and the world of politics, shared equally in both in a happy combination that fills us with envy and wonder. We know that something happened then in American history that can never happen again.
But there is no point now, more than two centuries later, in continuing to wallow in nostalgia and to aggravate our deep feelings of loss and deficiency. What we need is not more praise of the founders but more understanding of them and their circumstances. We need to find out why the revolutionary generation was able to combine ideas and politics so effectively and why subsequent generations in America could not do so. egalitarian culture and our democratic society. One of the prices we had to pay for democracy was a decline in the intellectual quality of American political life and an eventual separation between ideas and power. As the common man rose to power in the decades following the Revolution, the inevitable consequence was the displacement from power of the un-common man, the aristocratic man of ideas. Yet the revolutionary leaders were not merely victims of new circumstances; they were, in fact, the progenitors of these new circumstances. They helped create the changes that led eventually to their own undoing, to the breakup of the kind of political and intellectual coherence they represented. Without intending to, they willingly destroyed the sources of their own greatness.
Great as they were, the revolutionary leaders were certainly not demigods or superhuman individuals; they were very much the product of specific circumstances and a specific moment in time. Nor were they immune to the allures of interest that attracted most ordinary human beings. They wanted wealth and position and often speculated heavily in order to realize their aims. Indeed, several of the most prominent founders, such as financier of the Revolution Robert Morris and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court James Wilson, ended up in debtors' prison.
They were not demigods, but they were not democrats either, certainly not democrats in any modern manner. They were never embarrassed by talk of elitism, and they never hid their sense of superiority to ordinary folk. But neither were they contemptuous of common people; in fact they always believed that the people in general were the source of their authority. As historian Charles S. Sydnor pointed out long ago, they were the beneficiaries of a semiaristocratic political system, and their extraordinary leadership was due in large measure to processes that we today would consider undemocratic and detestable. 9 But even in their own undemocratic time and circumstances they were unusual, if not unique. As political leaders they constituted a peculiar sort of elite, a self-created aristocracy largely based on merit and talent that was unlike the hereditary nobility that ruled eighteenth-century English The eighteenth-century Anglo-American Enlightenment was preoccupied with politeness, which had a much broader meaning for people then than it does for us today. It implied more than manners and decorum. It meant affability sociability, cultivation; indeed, politeness was considered the source of civility, which was soon replaced by the word civilization.
Civilization implied a social process. Societies, it was assumed, moved through successive stages of historical development, beginning in rude simplicity and progressing to refined complexity of civilization. All nations could be located along this spectrum of social development. Since civilization was something that could be achieved, everything was enlisted in order to push back barbarism and ignorance and spread civility and refinement. Courtesy books that told Americans how to behave doubled in numbers during the middle decades of the eighteenth century. From such conduct manuals people learned how to act in company, how to clean their bodies, how to refine their tastes. Compilers of dictionaries attempted to find the correct meanings, spellings, and pronunciations of words and freeze them between the covers of their books.
In these ways peculiarities of dialect and eccentricities of spelling and pronunciation could be eliminated, and standards of the language could the founders and the enlightenment 13 be set. Even dueling, which flourished in the eighteenth century as never before, was justified as a civilizing agent, as a means of refinement; the threat of having to fight a duel compelled gentlemen to control their passions and inhibited them from using "illiberal language" with one another.
All sorts of new organizations and instruments sprang up to spread light and knowledge among people: learned societies, lending libraries, debating clubs, assembly rooms, reading groups, gentlemanly magazines, concerts, galleries, and museums. Eighteenth-century English speakers saw the beginning of culture as a public commodity, as something that was valuable, that gave status, and that could be acquired. The cultural world that we are familiar with today was born in the Age of Enlightenment. And provincial Americans, anxious to display their learning and politeness, were doing all they could to be part of that cultural world.
At the center of this new civilized world was the idea of a gentleman.
A gentleman, as the principal teacher of manners in the eighteenth century Lord Chesterfield defined him, was "a man of good behavior, well bred, amiable, high-minded, who knows how to act in any society, in the company of any man." 12 No word in the English language came to denote better the finest qualities of the ideal man than gentleman, and it was the enlightened eighteenth century above all that gave it that significance. Defining a proper gentleman was a subject that fascinated the ed- This age-old distinction between gentlemen and commoners had a vital meaning for the revolutionary generation that we today have totally lost. It marked a horizontal cleavage that divided the social hierarchy into two unequal parts almost as sharply as the distinction between officers and soldiers divided the army; indeed, the military division was related to the the founders and the enlightenment 15 larger social one. Gentlemen, who constituted about 5 to 10 percent of the society, were all those at the top of the social hierarchy who were wealthy enough not to have to work, or at least not to have to work with their hands, and who thus seemed able to act in a disinterested manner in promoting a public good.
Disinterestedness was the most common term the founders used as a synonym for the classical conception of virtue or self-sacrifice; it better conveyed the threats from interests that virtue seemed increasingly to face in the rapidly commercializing eighteenth century. Dr. Johnson had defined disinterested as being "superior to regard of private advantage; not influenced by private profit," and that was what the founders meant by the term. We today have lost most of this earlier meaning. Even educated people now use disinterested as a synonym for uninterested, meaning "indifferent or unconcerned." It is almost as if we cannot quite imagine someone who is capable of rising above a pecuniary interest and being unselfish or impartial where an interest might be present.
In the eighteenth-century Anglo-American world gentlemen believed that only independent individuals, free of interested ties and paid by no masters, could practice such virtue. It was thought that those who had occupations and had to work strenuously for a living lacked the leisure for virtuous public leadership. In the ideal polity, Aristotle had written thousands of years earlier, "the citizens must not live a mechanical or commercial life. Such a life is not noble, and it militates against virtue." For Aristotle not even agricultural workers could be citizens. For men "must have leisure to develop their virtue and for the activities of a citizen."
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Over several millennia this ancient ideal had lost much of its potency, but some of it lingered even into the eighteenth century. Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations (1776) thought that ordinary people in a modern complicated commercial society were too engaged in their occupations and the making of money to be able to make impartial judgments about the varied interests and occupations of their society. Only "those few, who being attached to no particular occupation themselves," said Smith, "have leisure and inclination to examine the occupations of other people." 17 These independent gentlemen of leisure who were presumed to be free of occupations and the marketplace were expected to supply the necessary leadership in government. Since well-to-do gentry were "exempted from the lower and less honourable employments," wrote the British philosopher Francis Hutcheson, they were "rather more than others obliged to an active life in some service to mankind. The publick has this claim upon them."
18 All the American founders felt the weight of this claim and often agonized and complained about it. The revolutionary leaders were not modern men. They did not conceive of politics as a profession and of officeholding as a career as politicians do today. Like Jefferson, they believed that "in a virtuous government . . . public offices are what they should be, burthens to those appointed to them, which it would be wrong to decline, though foreseen to bring with them intense labor, and great private loss." Public office was an obligation required of certain gentlemen because of their talents, independence, and social preeminence.
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In eighteenth-century America it had never been easy for gentlemen to make this personal sacrifice for the public, and it became especially difficult during the Revolution. Many of the revolutionary leaders, especially those of "small fortunes" who served in the Continental Congress, continually complained of the burdens of office and repeatedly begged to be relieved from those burdens in order to pursue their private interests.
Periodic temporary retirement from the cares and turmoil of office to one's country estate for refuge and rest was acceptable classical behavior.
But too often America's political leaders, especially in the North, men like Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr, had to retire not to relaxation in the solitude and leisure of a rural retreat but to the making of money in the busyness and bustle of a city law practice. In northern American society such independent gentlemen standing above the interests of the marketplace were harder to find, but the ideal remained strong. In ancient Rome, wrote James Wilson, magistrates and army officers were always gentleman farmers, always willing to step down "from the elevation of office" and reassume "with contentment and with pleasure, the peaceful labours of a rural and independent life." John Dickinson's pose as a farmer in his popular pamphlet of 1768 is incomprehensible except within this classical tradition. Dickinson, a wealthy Philadelphia lawyer, wanted to assure his readers of his gentlemanly disinterestedness by informing them at the outset that he was a farmer "con- Instead of the status of gentleman entitling a man to be an officer, too many ordinary men tried to use their military rank to prove that they were in fact gentlemen.
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Still, revolutionary America was far from an egalitarian society, and most middling sorts, however rich, were not readily accepted as gentlemen. Artisans and tradesmen who had acquired wealth and were politi- Sherman of Connecticut, found that they had to retire from business in order to attain high political office.
As aspiring gentlemen the leaders of the revolutionary generation shared these assumptions about work, politeness, and civilization. They were primed to receive all these new enlightened ideas about civility and gentility. Because America, as the future governor of New Jersey William
Livingston declared, was "just emerging from the rude unpolished Condition of an Infant country," it was especially eager to move along the spectrum of social development toward greater refinement and civilization, more so perhaps than England itself. 28 Indeed, all the talk of acquiring the enlightened attributes of a gentleman had a special appeal for all the outlying underdeveloped provinces of the greater British world, Scotland as well as North America.
As historian Franco Venturi once observed, the Enlightenment was created not in the centers of European culture but on its peripheries. It Today we are instinctively repelled by such calculation, such insincerity, such willingness to adapt and compromise for the sake of society, yet our distaste for such behavior is just another measure of our distance from the pre-Romantic eighteenth century.
The gentility and civility that these revolutionary leaders sought to achieve were public; they made sense only in society. Knowing how to act It is true that the founders did not accomplish all that many of them wanted. It turned out that they did not control their society and culture as much as they thought they did. They were also no more able accurately to predict their future than we can ours. In the end many of their enlightened hopes and their kind of elitist leadership were done in by the very democratic and egalitarian forces they had unleashed with their
Revolution.
No doubt all the founders assumed instinctively that the western territories would eventually belong to American settlers. But many of them were at the same time scrupulously concerned for the fate of the Indians who occupied those territories; indeed, the statements of Washington's secretary of war Henry Knox in the 1790s about the need for just treatment of the Native Americans a modern anthropologist might even applaud. But purchasing the Indians' rights to the land and assimilating or protecting them in a civilized manner as Knox recommended depended on an orderly and steady pace of settlement. The ordinary white settlers who moved west, flush with confidence that they were indeed the chosen people of God their leaders told them they were, paid no attention to the plans and policies concocted in eastern capitals. They went ahead and rapidly and chaotically scattered westward and thus stirred up warfare with the Indians into which the federal government was inevitably drawn.
Democracy and demography did the same for the other hopes and plans of the founders. All the prominent leaders thought that the liberal principles of the Revolution would eventually destroy the institution of slavery. When even southerners like Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and Henry
Laurens publicly deplored the injustice of slavery, from "that moment," declared the New York physician and abolitionist E. H. Smith in 1798, "the slow, but certain, death-wound was inflicted upon it." 41 Of course such predictions could have not been more wrong. Far from being doomed, slavery in the United States in the 1790s was on the verge of its greatest expansion. Indeed, at the end of the revolutionary era there were more slaves in the nation than in 1760.
But such self-deception, such mistaken optimism, by the revolutionary leaders was understandable, for they wanted to believe the best, and initially there was evidence that slavery was dying out. The northern states, where slavery was not inconsequential, were busy trying to eliminate the institution, and by 1804 all had done so. The founders thought the same thing might happen in the southern states. Not only were there more antislave societies created in the South than in the North, but manumissions in the upper South grew rapidly in the years immediately following the end of the War for Independence. Many believed that ending the international slave trade in 1808 would eventually kill off the institution of slavery. The reason the founders so readily took the issue of slavery off the table in the 1790s was this mistaken faith in the future. As the founders and the enlightenment 27
Oliver Ellsworth, the third chief justice of the United States, declared, "As population increases, poor labourers will be so plenty as to render slaves useless. Slavery in time will not be a speck in our country." 42 The leaders simply did not count on the remarkable demographic capacity of the slave states themselves, especially Virginia, to produce slaves for the expanding areas of the Deep South and the Southwest. Also, whatever the revolutionary leaders might have wished for in ending slavery was nullified by the demands of ordinary white planters for more slaves.
If we want to know why we can never again replicate the extraordinary generation of the founders, there is a simple answer: the growth of what we today presumably value most about American society and culture, egalitarian democracy. In the early nineteenth century the voices of ordinary people, at least ordinary white people, began to be heard as never before in history, and they soon overwhelmed the high-minded desires and aims of the revolutionary leaders who had brought them into being.
The founders had succeeded only too well in promoting democracy and equality among ordinary people; indeed, they succeeded in preventing any duplication of themselves.
